

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 EA-11 IO-12 ADP-00 AEC-11 AF-10 ARA-11

CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-09 H-02 INR-10 L-03 NASA-04 NEA-10

NSAE-00 NSC-10 OIC-04 PA-03 PRS-01 RSC-01 GAC-01

SCI-06 SS-15 MBFR-03 USIA-12 SAJ-01 RSR-01 /196 W

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3558  
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN  
USMISSION EC BRUSSELS  
AMCONGEN HONG KONG  
USMISSION GENEVA  
USMISSION IAEA VIENNA  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
USDEL SALT TWO

SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 TOKYO 5417

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, IAEA, JA

SUBJ: PROSPECTS FOR JAPANESE RATIFICATION OF NPT

REF: STATE 69815

SUMMARY: SINCE NPT IS UNPOPULAR, IF JAPAN EVENTUALLY RATIFIES,  
IT WILL BE AS RESULT OF SLOW PROCESS IN WHICH INTERNATIONAL  
CIRCUMSTANCES RIPEN AND ARGUMENTS AGAINST RATIFICATION ARE ONE  
BY ONE ANSWERED BY PROGRESS OF EVENTS. THIS PROCESS HAS BEEN  
MOVING IN FAVORABLE DIRECTION FOR SOME TIME BUT AT UNEXPECTEDLY  
SLOW PACE. SIGNING OF EURATOM- IAEA SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT WAS  
IMPORTANT IMILESTONE. NEXT MAJOR STEP FOR JAPAN IS  
NEGOTIATION OF JAPAN- IAEA SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT. GOJ  
BUREAUCRATS ARE OPTIMISTIC SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT IS  
POSSIBLE AND HAVE BEENSMRATHER SLOWLY PREPARING FOR NEGOTIATIONS.

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NEGOTIATION OF JAPANESE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT, COMPLETION OF US- IAEA SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT AND RATIFICATION OF NPT BY EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY FRG, ARE EVENTS WHICH WILL CREATE CIRCUMSTANCES FAVORABLE TO JAPANESE RATIFICATION. IT IS POSSIBLE THESE DEVELOPMENTS MAY LEAD GOJ TO PRESENT NPT TO DIET DURING DEC 73- MAY 74 SESSION BUT IT MORE LIKELY PRESENTATION MAY BE MADE AT DEC 74- MAY 75 SESSION. WHILE PROCESS IS NOW GRADUALLY MOVING TOWARD EVENTUAL RATIFICATION A VARIETY OF UNFAVORABLE DEVELOPMENTS COULD DISRUPT TREND. HENCE, JAPANESE RATIFICATION REMAINS POSSIBILITY OR PROBABILITY BUT IS NOT RPT NOT CERTAINTY. END SUMMARY

1. SAFEGUARDS: AS INDICATED IN GOJ' S FEB 2, 1970 STATEMENT ON SIGNING THE NPT, JAPAN WOULD NOT CONSIDER RATIFICATION UNTIL SATISFACTORY JAPAN- IAEA NPT SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT HAD BEEN NEGOTIATED. CONCERNED GOJ OFFICIALS ARE NOW REASONABLY CONFIDENT THAT SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT CAN BE NEGOTIATED, BUT EXPECT NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE LONG AND DIFFICULT. WHILE GOJ HAS HAD SEVERAL CONTACTS WITH IAEA CONCERNING SAFEGUARDS, SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS OF JAPAN' S SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT HAVE NOT YET BEGUN. WHILE GOJ OFFICIALS STATE THAT GOVERNMENT IS NOW PREPARING FOR THESE NEGOTIATIONS, PREPARATIONS HAVE BEEN DRAGGING ON FOR SEVERAL MONTHS. NEVERTHELESS, IT IS PROBABLE THESE NEGOTIATIONS WILL COMMENCE IN THE NOT TOO DISTANT FUTURE. GOJ' S APPROACH TO SAFEGUARDS ISSUE IS DESCRIBED IN TOKYO' S 2488.

2. TIMING OF RATIFICATION: TIMETABLE FOR RATIFICATION DEPENDS ON COMPLETION OF SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT, TIME REQUIRED FOR LDP LEADERSHIP TO MOLD LDP SUPPORT FOR RATIFICATION AND SCHEDULE OF DIET SESSIONS. IF SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT IS COMPLETED IN 1973 AND GOJ/ LDP LEADERSHIP GRASPS NPT ISSUE BY HORNS, THEN SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT AND NPT COULD BE PRESENTED TO NEXT REGULAR DIET SESSION ( DEC 73- MAY 74) FOR RATIFICATION. HOWEVER, IT IS MORE LIKELY THAT SAFEGUARDS NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE TIME CONSUMING AND THAT MOLDING OF LDP SUPPORT WILL REQUIRE LONG, THOROUGH DISCUSSION. HENCE, IT IS MORE REALISTIC TO PREDICT THAT GOJ MAY BE IN POSITION TO PRESENT NPT TO DIET DURING DEC 74- MAY 75 REGULAR DIET SESSION. IF DURING WINTER OF 74-75 EVENS ARE MOVING TOWARD RATIFICATION, PROPONENTS OF NPT WILL PROBABLY ARGUE THAT JAPAN SHOULD RATIFY

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BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE TO REVIEW OPERATION OF NPT ( STIPULATED IN ARTICLE 8 PARA 3 OF NPT ) IS CONVENTED IN 1975.

3. KEY ISSUES FOR LDP: LDP SUPPORT IS ESSENTIAL FOR DIET RATIFICATION. WHILE ATTITUDES TOWARD RATIFICATION HAVE NOT SOLIDIFIED, THERE IS CONSIDERABLE BODY OF OPINION WITHIN LDP

WHICH DOUBTS WISDOM OF EARLY RATIFICATION FOR VARIETY OF SECURITY, TECHNICAL AND EMOTIONAL REASONS. LDP LEADERS OF THIS TANAKA ADMINISTRATION, LIKE THEIR PREDECESSORS IN SATO CABINET, RECOGNIZE THAT ASTUTE AND FIRM LEADERSHIP WILL BE NECESSARY TO MOLD PARTY CONSENSUS FAVORING RATIFICATION. AS SUCH LEADERSHIP WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE IF THE PARTY WERE TORN BY FEUDS, INTERNAL STABILITY IN LDP IS ANOTHER CONDITION FOR DECISION TO RATIFY.

4. WHILE WIDE SPECTRUM OF ISSUES SHAPE JAPANESE ATTITUDES TOWARD RATIFICATION ( SEE TOKYO A-484 OF MAY 18, 1972), THREE ISSUES WILL PROBABLY BE CENTRAL IN EFFORT TO MOLD CONSENSUS WITHIN LDP - ( A) EQUALITY IN SAFEGUARDS, ( B) QUESTION OF WHETHER JAPAN'S SECURITY CAN BE ASSURED AFTER RATIFICATION, AND ( C) CONTINUING US COMMITMENT TO NPT SYSTEM.

EQUALITY - LDP MEMBERS, AS WELL AS OTHERS, WILL HAVE TO BE CONVINCED THAT JAPAN'S SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT DOES NOT TREAT JAPAN DISADVANTAGEOUSLY WITH RESPECT TO OTHER MAJOR ATOMIC ENERGY STATES IN EUROPE ( EURATOM- IAEA AGREEMENT) AND US ( US VOLUNTARY OFFER). THE COMMONLY USED PHRASEOLOGY IS THAT JAPAN MUST BE TREATED QTE EQUALLY UNQTE. GOJ BUREAUCRATS' CONFIDENCE ABOUT SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT NEGOTIATIONS IMPLIES BELIEF THAT RESULTING AGREEMENT CAN BE SATISFACTORILY EXPLAINED AS BEING EQUAL. IN RECENT DIET TESTIMONY, GOJ REPS HAVE REVEALED LINE THEY WILL PROBABLY TAKE, THAT IS THAT GOJ IS SEEKING ( AND WILL BE SATISFIED WITH) QTE PRACTICAL EQUALITY UNQTE. FONMIN OHIRA HAS SAID THAT ONCE SATISFACTORY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT OBTAINED, THERE WILL BE NO QTE MAJOR OBSTACLE UNQTE TO RATIFICATION ( TOKYO 4691). SECURITY GUARANTEES - OHIRA'S REMARK ABOUT QTE MAJOR OBSTACLES UNQTE NOTWITHSTANDING, RELIABILITY OF ASSURANCES OF THE SECURITY OF NON- NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES ( I. E. JAPAN) UNDER NPT WILL CERTAINLY BE IMPORTANT

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SCI-06 SS-15 MBFR-03 USIA-12 SAJ-01 RSR-01 /196 W

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FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO  
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INFO AMEMBASSY BONN  
USMISSION EC BRUSSELS  
AMCONGEN HONG KONG  
USMISSION GENEVA  
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CONCERN OF GOJ AND LDP LEADERS. AS SENSITIVITY OF NUCLEAR ISSUES IN JAPAN MAKES IT ALL BUT IMPOSSIBLE TO PUBLICLY DISCUSS MATTERS SUCH AS IMPLICATIONS OF CHINA'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM, CREDIBILITY OF US DETERRENT OR JAPAN'S NUCLEAR OPTIONS, MOST OF DISCUSSION ON SECURITY GUARANTEES WILL BE CONDUCTED BY GOVERNMENT AND PARTY LEADERS AWAY FROM PUBLIC SCRUTINY. IN FINAL ANALYSIS, RELIABILITY OF US AS ALLY AND MILITARY CREDIBILITY OF US NUCLEAR DETERRENT WILL PROBABLY BE DECISIVE FACTORS SHAPING OPINIONS ON THIS ISSUE. US COMMITMENT TO NPT. ANY INDICATION THAT US COMMITMENT TO NPT SYSTEM IS DECLINING WILL BE SEIZED UPON BY OPPONENTS OF JAPANESE RATIFICATION AS REASON WHY JAPAN SHOULD POSTPONE RATIFICATION.

5. ATTITUDES IN LDP HAVE NOT YET TAKEN SHAPE AND IT IS DIFFICULT TO PREDICT WHAT POSITIONS VARIOUS PARTY LEADERS WILL TAKE WHEN THE ISSUE IS JOINED. NEVERTHELESS, IT APPEARS THAT MOST

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SENIOR PARTY LEADERS ARE GENERALLY FAVORABLE TO, ALTHOUGH NOT ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT, NPT RATIFICATION. WHILE TO EMBASSYBOS KNOWLEDGE PRIMIN TANAKA HAS NOT COMMENTED PUBLICLY ON NPT ISSUE, TANAKA HAS CONSISTENTLY AND STRONGLY EXPRESSED HIS OPPOSITION TO JAPAN'S EVER POSSESSING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. OHIRA AND FUKUDA, DURING THEIR TENURES AS FONMIN, HAVE EACH EXPRESSED GOJ POSITION THAT ONCE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT COMPLETED, THERE IS NO IMPORTANT REASON NOT TO RATIFY. DEPUTY PRIMIN MIKI'S VIEWS ARE UNCERTAIN BUT PROBABLY FAVORABLE. ONLY MAJOR LDP FACTION LEADER WHO HAS CONSISTENTLY EXPRESSED OPPOSITION TO EARLY RATIFICATION IS NAKASONE. AT SECOND ECHELON, FORMER FONMINS AICHI AND KOSAKA CAN BE COUNTED ON TO SUPPORT RATIFICATION. VIEWS OF TANAKA'S CLOSE CONFIDANTS, NIKAI DO AND HASHIMOTO (LDP SEC GEN), ARE NOT WELL KNOWN. THE LDP'S SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON NPT IS STILL HEADED BY RATIFICATION ADVOCATE, SASAKI. IT IS PROBABLE THAT, IF CIRCUMSTANCES FAVORING RATIFICATION RIPEN AND IF STABILITY PREVAILS IN LDP, LEADERSHIP WOULD BE PREPARED TO UNDERTAKE DIFFICULT TASK OF MOLDING PARTY CONSENSUS.

6. NON- LDP ATTITUDES TOWARD NPT: ATOMIC ENERGY INDUSTRY,

MOST DIRECTLY AFFECTED DOMESTIC INTEREST GROUP, SUPPORTS RATIFICATION ON CONDITION THAT SATISFACTORY SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT OBTAINED. ATOMIC ENERGY INDUSTRY, WHOSE ATTITUDES ARE SHAPED BY AWARENESS OF JAPAN'S RELIANCE ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION FOR DEVELOPMENT OF PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY, IS CONSTRUCTIVELY COOPERATING IN PREPARATIONS FOR APPLICATION OF NPT SAFEGUARDS IN JAPAN. WHILE ITS VIEWS ARE ALREADY WELL KNOWN, ATOMIC ENERGY INDUSTRY CAN BE EXPECTED TO WEIGH IN PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY IN SUPPORT OF RATIFICATION AT APPROPRIATE MOMENT. DEFENSE COMMUNITY'S VIEWS ON NPT HAVE NOT BEEN AIRED PUBLICLY FOR MANY MONTHS, BUT MANY DEFENSE ANALYSTS CAN BE EXPECTED TO PRIVATELY DISCOURAGE EARLY RATIFICATION. WHILE OPPOSITION PARTIES HAVE NOT RECENTLY ENUNCIATED VIEWS ON RATIFICATION, ALL EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS ABOUT WISDOM OF JAPAN'S SIGNING NPT IN 1970. WITH EXCEPTION OF JCP, WHICH IS IN PRINCIPLE OPPOSED TO NPT, OTHER OPPOSITION PARTIES' ATTITUDES WILL BE MORE INFLUENCED BY CONSIDERATION OF HOW TO GAIN POLITICAL MILEAGE OUT OF NPT DOMESTICALLY THAN BY MERITS OF ISSUE. HENCE, IF GOJ DELAYS TOO LONG ON NPT RATIFICATION, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOME IN OPPOSITION MAY CRITICIZE LDP'S DELAY AND END UP SUPPORTING

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RATIFICATION. RECENT JSP QUESTIONS IN DIET ILLUSTRATE THIUC POSSIBILITY. HOWEVER, IT IS MORE PROBABLE THAT MOST OPPOSITION PARTIES WILL BE RELUCTANT TO SUPPORT LDP EFFORTS TO OBTAIN DIET RATIFICATION.

7. PRESS HAS PAID BUT LITTLE ATTENTION TO NPT IN PAST TWO YEARS. HOWEVER, SEVERAL PAPERREKHAVE PUBLISHED EDITORIALS IN RECENT MONTHS URGING NEGOTIATION OF SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT AND RATIFICATION OF NPT ( YOMIURI IN JULY 72 AND FEB 73, SANKEI IN AUG 72, ASAHI IN OCT 72, JAN 73 AND APRIL 73 AND NIHON KEIZAI IN APRIL 1973). FONOFF OFTEN BACKGROUNDS PRESS ON DISARMAMENT ISSUES IN HOPES OF GETTING FAVORABLE PRESS COVERAGE. THIS MAY EXPLAIN WHY EDITORIALS EXPRESS VIEWS WHICH EMBOFFS OFTEN HEAR FROM FONOFF CONTACTS.

8. THE PROCESS AND PROSPECTS: NPT IS NOT POPULAR IN JAPAN, AND THERE IS NOT NOTICEABLE ENTHUSIASM FOR RATIFICATION. IF JAPAN RATIFIES, IT WILL BE AS RESULT OF SLOW PROCESS IN WHICH INTERNATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES RIPEN AND ARGUMENTS AGAINST RATIFICATION ARE ONE BY ONE ANSWERED BY EVENTS. THIS PROCESS WILL PRODUCE SITUATION IN WHICH NPT SUPPORTERS WILL EVENTUALLY ARGUE THAT RATIFICATION IS QTE UNAVOIDABLE UNQTE. WHILE THIS RIPENING PROCESS IS PROGRESSING MORE SLOWLY THAN HAD BEEN EXPECTED, NOTHING HAS YET OCCURRED TO DISTURB GRADUAL MOVEMENT TOWARD RATIFICATION. NEVERTHELESS, RATIFICATION IS STILL FAR OFF AND THERE ARE SEVERAL PROBLEMS WHICH MIGHT REVERSE PRESENT FAVORABLE TREND OF EVENTS, NAMELY PROBLEMS IN JAPAN- IAEA SAFEGUARDS NEGOTIATIONS, LOSS OF CREDIBILITY IN US DETERRENT,

DECISION TO QTE GO NUCLEAR UNQTE BY INDIA OR SOME OTHER  
THRESHOLD NUCLEAR POWER, FAILURE OF FRG TO RATIFY NPT,  
INTERNAL STRIFE WITHIN LDP.

9. IN SUM, WHILE COURSE OF EVENTS IS NOW SLOWLY MOVING  
JAPAN IN DESIRED DIRECTION, RATIFICATION WITHIN NEXT  
TWO YEARS IS STILL ONLY A POSSIBILITY OR PROBABILITY, BUT  
DEFINITELY NOT RPT NOT A CERTAINTY.  
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\*\*\* Current Handling Restrictions \*\*\* n/a

\*\*\* Current Classification \*\*\* SECRET

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**TAGS:** PARM, JA, IAEA  
**To:** ACDA  
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EC BRUSSELS  
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IAEA VIENNA  
LONDON

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